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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 






Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides that, subject to 
certain exceptions inapplicable here, the owner of a 
copyright has: 
 
       the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the 
       following: 
 
       . . . 
 
       (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
       copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer 
       of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; [and] 
 
       (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
       choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion 
       pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
       copyrighted work publicly. 
 
17 U.S.C. S 106. 
 
Another section of the same statute provides: 
 
       On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable 
       rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
       within the general scope of copyright as specified by 
       section 106 . . . are governed exclusively by this title. 
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       Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or 
       equivalent right in any such work under the common 
       law or statutes of any State. 
 
17 U.S.C. S 301. 
 
Section 203-7 of the Pennsylvania Feature Motion Picture 
Fair Business Practices Law (the "Pennsylvania Act") 
provides that: 
 
       No license agreement shall be entered into between 
       distributor and exhibitor to grant an exclusivefirst run 
       or an exclusive multiple first run for more than 42 
       days without provision to expand the run to second 
       run or subsequent run theatres within the 
       geographical area and license agreements and prints of 
       said feature motion picture shall be made available by 
       the distributor to those subsequent run theatres that 
       would normally be served on subsequent run 
       availability. 
 
73 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 203-7. 
 
Appellant Miramax Film Corp., a motion picture 
production and distribution company, appeals the District 
Court's failure to overturn a jury's award of damages of 
$159,780 to plaintiff Orson, Inc., the owner of a Center City 
Philadelphia (referred to as "Center City") movie theater, for 
Miramax's violation of section 203-7 of the Pennsylvania 
Act by entering into an exclusive first-run exhibition 
agreement for more than forty-two days with another 
Center City theater. See Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 
983 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Miramax argues for 
reversal on the ground, inter alia, that the Pennsylvania Act 
is preempted because it interferes with a copyright holder's 
authority to exercise its exclusive rights to license the work. 
Before we can address this provocative legal issue, we must 
first consider Orson's argument that this court has already 
decided this issue contrary to Miramax's position and that 
we are bound to reject Miramax's preemption argument by 
the law of the case doctrine and our own binding precedent. 
 




FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This is the second time the parties are before this court 
in this case. The facts are presented in detail in our first 
opinion which followed the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Miramax. See Orson, Inc. v. 
Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Orson I"). 
Nonetheless, we recount the facts necessary for the issue 
presented here. 
 
Miramax distributes art films nationally, including in 
Philadelphia and the surrounding metropolitan area. The 
parties have not attempted to define "art films" other than 
as we previously did by contrasting them with "movies that 
may be characterized as `commercial' or `mainstream.' " Id. 
at 1362. Only a limited number of theaters in any area 
exhibit art films. Orson showed primarily second-run art 
films from January 1992 through October 1994 through 
the Roxy Screening Rooms, a Center City movie theater 
with two screens. The first runs of Miramax's art films were 
shown in Center City at the Ritz Theaters, a pair of theaters 
with five screens each, the Ritz Five and the Ritz at the 
Bourse (collectively, the "Ritz"). During its two and one-half 
years of operation by Orson, the Roxy received only one 
first-run movie from Miramax, and rarely received second- 
run movies after the forty-second day of play at the Ritz, 
despite repeated requests. 
 
In August 1993, Orson filed suit against Miramax, 
charging that Miramax's distribution of films, specifically in 
its dealings with the Ritz, violated the Sherman Act, the 
Pennsylvania common law tort of unreasonable restraint of 
trade, and section 203-7 of the Pennsylvania Act. The 
District Court granted Miramax's motion for summary 
judgment as to both Orson's federal and state antitrust 
claims. It also granted summary judgment to Miramax as to 
Orson's claim under section 203-7 of the Pennsylvania Act 
for nine of the fifteen films at issue because it construed 
that provision as satisfied by Miramax's expansion of the 
distribution of those films to suburban theaters before the 
forty-third day of their runs at the Ritz; by agreement of the 
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parties, it dismissed without prejudice Orson's claim as to 
the six remaining films. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 
862 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Orson appealed. 
 
This court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to 
Miramax on the antitrust claim and the restraint of trade 
claim. Orson I, 79 F.3d at 1358. The principal portion of 
our opinion was directed to analyzing how the legal 
principles regarding restraint of trade applied to the 
arrangement by which Miramax granted the Ritz an 
exclusive license to exhibit its first-run films. We concluded 
that "Orson failed to present sufficient evidence to support 
its claim that the Miramax-Ritz clearances were 
unreasonable restraints of trade." Id. at 1372. 
 
On the other hand, we vacated the judgment for Miramax 
on Orson's claim under the Pennsylvania Act because we 
determined that the District Court had erred in its 
interpretation of section 203-7. The District Court had 
construed the statutory requirement that a distributor, 
such as Miramax, expand the run of the film after forty-two 
days to other theaters in the "geographical area" to have 
been satisfied by Miramax's expansion to suburban 
theaters. We held, in the absence of any applicable opinion 
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that the relevant 
geographical area for purposes of section 203-7 was the 
same area covered by the license, i.e., Center City 
Philadelphia. Because the record was disputed or 
incomplete, we remanded for further proceedings as to 
whether Miramax's actions as to those films violated section 
203-7 of the Pennsylvania Act. Id. at 1374-75. 
 
On remand, the case proceeded to a jury trial, and the 
jury awarded Orson damages of $159,780. See Orson, Inc., 
983 F. Supp. at 626. The District Court denied Miramax's 
post-trial motions. The court held that Orson had presented 
sufficient evidence to establish that Miramax had caused 
the injury, that Miramax acted willfully and intentionally, 
and that the damages were proper. Id. at 634-36. 
 
Additionally, the District Court rejected Miramax's 
challenge to the constitutionality of section 203-7. The 
court concluded that Third Circuit precedents had decided 
the question of the facial validity of the Pennsylvania Act; 
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moreover, those same precedents "effectively foreclosed" an 
as-applied challenge. Id. at 630. 
 
Miramax filed a timely notice of appeal. It argues that 
section 203-7 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, 
that the finding of willful and intentional violation is 
erroneous as a matter of law, and that there was no 
evidence to support the assumption that the Roxy (Orson's 
theater) would have exhibited the films after forty-two days. 




EFFECT OF PRIOR DECISIONS 
 
We engage in plenary review of a Motion for Judgment as 
a Matter of Law and apply the same standards as the 
district court. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 
1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). Where the issue involves purely 
a question of law, such as federal preemption, we review 
the decision of the district court de novo. See Espinal v. 
Northwest Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1996). 
However, Orson contends that we are foreclosed from 
examining the legal issue presented because of the law of 
the case doctrine and the holdings of our prior decisions. 
 
A. Law of the Case 
 
Orson's reliance on the law of the case doctrine need not 
detain us long. This doctrine precludes a court from 
reconsidering "issues previously resolved by an earlier 
panel" in the same case. Atlantic Coast Demolition & 
Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 112 F.3d 
652, 663 (3d Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Local 560 
(I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315, 329 (3d Cir. 1992) ("When an 
appellate court decides a legal issue, that decision governs 
all subsequent proceedings in the same case."). As we 
stated in Schultz v. Onan Corp., 737 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 
1984), "[T]he law of the case doctrine applies `to issues that 
were actually discussed by the court in the prior appeal 
[and] to issues decided by necessary implication." Miramax 
argues that there was no such discussion the first time this 
case was before us. 
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Orson's law of the case argument is predicated on a 
footnote in Orson I stating that this court had already 
rejected a facial preemption challenge to section 203-7. See 
79 F.3d at 1373 n.14. However, an examination of Orson I 
shows plainly that it did not resolve the legal issues 
regarding preemption that Miramax raises on appeal. 
 
As we noted at the outset, Orson I was an appeal by 
Orson from the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
to Miramax in Orson's suit alleging that Miramax violated 
the federal antitrust laws, engaged in restraint of trade and 
violated section 203-7 of the Pennsylvania Act. See Orson 
Inc., 862 F. Supp. at 1381. On appeal, after we considered 
and affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the 
antitrust and restraint of trade counts, we turned to 
Orson's claims based on section 203-7. Because the 
District Court had not construed section 203-7 to require 
expansion after forty-two days in Center City, we remanded 
for further proceedings because the summary judgment 
record was either "disputed or incomplete in critical 
respects." Id. at 1374. 
 
There is no indication in the opinion that we focused on 
the possibility that we could have avoided the remand if we 
had decided that the Copyright Act preempted section 203- 
7. At most, we rather summarily read our prior case law 
regarding section 203-7 as having decided that issue. We 
noted Miramax's contention that the federal Copyright Act 
would preempt section 203-7 if the Act "were interpreted 
this way," id. at 1373 n.14, but because we believed that 
we had previously rejected a facial challenge on that ground 
in two prior cases, see Associated Film Distrib. Corp. v. 
Thornburgh ("AFD I"), 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982), and 
Associated Film Distrib. Corp. v. Thornburgh ("AFDI II"), 800 
F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1986), we did not discuss it further. 
Orson I, 79 F.3d at 1373 n.14. Therefore, because the 
preemption issue was neither actually discussed nor 
necessarily decided by implication in Orson I -- the only 
prior decision to which the law of the case doctrine might 
arguably apply -- we hold that doctrine inapplicable here. 
 
Therefore, we turn to consider Orson's argument that our 
precedents on the preemption issue now foreclose our 
review of Miramax's preemption claim. 
 
                                7 
  
B. Third Circuit IOP 9.1 
 
Orson argues that this court decided in AFD I that 
section 203-7 was not preempted by the federal Copyright 
Act, and that therefore we are bound to that decision by 
our Internal Operating Procedure ("IOP") 9.1.1 That IOP 
reflects this court's commitment to "maintain a consistent 
body of circuit jurisprudence." A.C.L.U. of New Jersey v. 
Schundler, 1999 WL 77766 at *24 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
 
The complaint in AFD I was filed shortly after the passage 
in 1980 of the Pennsylvania Act. That Act comprehensively 
regulates several aspects of the licensing, distribution, and 
exhibition of films. It requires blind bidding by theaters, 
outlines specific procedures for that bidding, prohibits 
advances, and strictly curtails minimum guarantees. See 
73 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 203-1-203-6. It also includes the 
section at issue here, which provides that no license 
agreement between a distributor and an exhibitor can grant 
an exclusive first run for more than forty-two days without 
provision to expand the run to second-run or subsequent- 
run theatres within the geographical area. See 73 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. S 203-7. Finally, the Act creates private causes of 
action by exhibitors against distributors for violations of its 
provisions. See 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 203-10. The 
Pennsylvania courts have never interpreted the Act's 
provisions. 
 
The plaintiffs in AFD I, movie distributors and producers, 
filed a motion for declaratory judgment in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
challenging the entire statutory scheme on various 
grounds. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
plaintiffs on all their claims. See Associated Film Distrib. 
Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971, 996 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
The court held that the Pennsylvania Act violated both the 
First Amendment by indirectly restraining dissemination of 
protected expression, id. at 991, and the Supremacy Clause 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. IOP 9.1 states: "It is the tradition of this court that the holding of 
a 
panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no 
subsequent panel overrules the holding in a published opinion of a 
previous panel. Court in banc consideration is required to do so." 
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because it was preempted by the federal Copyright Act. Id. 
at 995-96. 
 
In reaching the latter conclusion, the district court held 
that certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Act, such as 
those prohibiting advances, prohibiting guarantees in 
percentage leases, requiring advance screenings, and 
requiring certain bidding procedures, interfered with the 
essence of the copyright grant because the provisions 
"substantially restrict the conditions under which a 
copyright holder may distribute and license its work." Id. at 
994. The district court recognized that an Ohio district 
court had upheld the constitutionality of a similar, but not 
identical, Ohio statute. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
SS 1333.05-07 (Baldwin 1998). Nonetheless, the district 
court in AFD I, emphasizing the differences between the 
Pennsylvania and Ohio laws, viewed the Pennsylvania Act's 
"broad and comprehensive regulation" to conflict with the 
federal objectives of the Copyright Act. 520 F. Supp. at 995. 
The court also concluded that the requirement in section 
203-7, requiring that "[a]fter 42 days thefilm must be 
reoffered for licensing and the run must be `expanded,' " 
interfered with the copyright holder's freedom to license. Id. 
at 994-95. 
 
On appeal, this court reversed. AFD I, 683 F.2d at 817. 
In our discussion, we relied essentially on the analysis 
detailed both in the Ohio district court opinion reviewing 
the Ohio statute and in the Sixth Circuit's opinion on 
appeal. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. 
Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in relevant part and 
remanded in part, 679 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1982). With 
respect to the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims,2 we 
quoted extensively from the Ohio district court opinion, 
which had rejected the First Amendment challenge, but we 
stated that because the trial court here had granted 
summary judgment, it was not able to evaluate the actual 
impact of the Act, if any, on First Amendment values, it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the District Court's opinion referred exclusively to the First 
Amendment, it is established that the Fourteenth Amendment applies 
the provisions of the First Amendment to the states. See 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 n.1 (1996). 
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could not assess the weight of the state's concerns, and it 
could not make the necessary balance between the 
distributor's protected rights and the nature and weight of 
the state's concerns. AFD I, 683 F.2d at 813-14. 
Accordingly, we remanded the case so that the district 
court could apply the standards articulated in the Ohio 
cases to the Pennsylvania Act. 
 
We also decided that the court should not have granted 
summary judgment on the copyright preemption claim. 
Again, we relied almost exclusively on the analysis used by 
the Ohio district court and the Sixth Circuit, which had 
rejected the similar contentions made there. Id. at 816. 
 
It is significant (and overlooked in our prior opinions) 
that the Ohio district court, in deciding that the Ohio 
statute did not create, grant or destroy any rights that are 
"equivalent" to the exclusive rights of the federal Copyright 
Act, stated, "Indeed, by providing procedures for the 
licensing of a film, the Act recognizes sub silentio the right 
of the copyright owner to exhibit the motion picture and to 
grant an exclusive or restrictive license to others to exhibit 
it." Allied Artists Pictures, 496 F. Supp. at 443. The Sixth 
Circuit agreed with this language, see 679 F.2d at 663, and 
we quoted it verbatim in AFD I. 683 F.2d at 814-15 n.11. 
However, as with the First Amendment issue, we concluded 
that the trial court should not have reached its decision on 
summary judgment, and we remanded the preemption 
issue, noting that although the Act on its face contains no 
threat to the copyrights themselves: 
 
       The question of whether and to what extent the 
       Pennsylvania Act interferes with attaining the 
       "purposes and objectives of Congress" is one which 
       must be resolved before the trial court can decide, as a 
       matter of law, whether the interference (if any) is such 
       as to require invalidation of all or part of the 
       Pennsylvania Act on preemption grounds. 
 
Id. at 816 (emphasis added). 
 
We emphasize that the Ohio statute did not have any 
limitation on the length of the first run, that the Ohio court 
on which we relied in AFD I stated that the Ohio statute 
sub silentio recognized the copyright owner's right to grant 
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an exclusive license to exhibit the film, and that our 
opinion in AFD I quoted that language about the copyright 
owner's right to grant an exclusive license to exhibit the 
film. 
 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, at most AFD I 
remanded the legal decision with respect to the 42-day rule, 
along with the provisions of the Act that we actually 
discussed in the opinion, so the district court could 
determine "whether and to what extent the Pennsylvania 
Act interferes with attaining the `purposes and objectives of 
Congress.' " Id. at 816. That we did not decide the 
preemption issue is evident from the statement in the same 
sentence that this question "is one which must be resolved 
before the trial court can decide, as a matter of law, 
whether the interference (if any) is such as to require 
invalidation of all or part of the Pennsylvania Act on 
preemption grounds." Id. (emphasis added). If we had 
decided the copyright preemption issue as a matter of law, 
there would have been no reason to remand for the trial 
court to decide the same preemption issue as a matter of 
law. Indeed, the most direct statement in AFD I  regarding 
section 203-7 -- "particularly with regard to the 42-day 
provision, the Pennsylvania Act may have a greater impact 
upon plaintiffs' copyright rights than the Ohio Act," id. at 
816 n.12 -- suggests a potential preemption problem with 
that section. 
 
Surprisingly for a decision on which all the later cases 
depend, the 42-day rule is never discussed or analyzed in 
AFD I, undoubtedly because the Ohio statute under 
discussion in the Ohio district court and the Sixth Circuit 
opinions on which we relied did not have any comparable 
provision. Moreover, we cannot regard our decision in AFD 
I as a legal determination on the preemptive effect of the 
Copyright Act on section 203-7 because the construction of 
the requirements imposed by section 203-7 was first given 
in Orson I, fourteen years after AFD I. Before that case, the 
district judges had different understandings of the language 
of that section. See Associated Film Distrib. , 520 F. Supp. 
at 994-95 ("After 42 days, the film must be reoffered for 
licensing, and the run must be `expanded.' "); Associated 
Film Distrib., 614 F. Supp. at 1123-24 ("The statute does 
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not prevent distributors from contracting for runs longer 
than six weeks. . . . The statute also does not prevent a 
distributor from entering into a series of exclusive licenses 
with exhibitors as long as each license does not exceed 42 
days."); Orson, Inc., 862 F. Supp. at 1387 (Requirement for 
expansion after 42 days satisfied because several of the 
films under consideration " `expanded' to other Philadelphia 
area theaters, outside of Center City Philadelphia, before 
the 42-day period expired."). It was not until we reversed 
the District Court's decision in Orson I that this court 
provided our definitive construction of section 203-7, viz., 
that it required the copyright holder to expand its license to 
another exhibitor within the same geographic area, that is, 
Center City. 
 
In case after case, courts commented on the vague and 
uncertain meaning of the statutory language. See, e.g., 
Associated Film Distrib., 614 F. Supp. at 1111 ("this part of 
the statute [section 203-7] was inartfully drafted, and 
distributors interpret its requirements differently"); Orson, 
Inc., 862 F. Supp. at 1387 (characterizing statute's wording 
as "sufficiently vague" to permit alternate readings). It 
would be stretching for us to hold IOP 9.1 applicable in 
these circumstances. See, e.g., Connors v. Beth Energy 
Mines, Inc., 920 F.2d 205, 211 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding 
IOP 9.1 inapplicable when prior decision predicated on a 
different record). 
 
Orson may have been misled because we also fell into the 
same error regarding the precedential effect of AFD I in two 
later decisions. After the remand in AFD I, the district 
court, after a six-week bench trial, issued its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in which it upheld the 
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Act against all 
challenges. See Associated Film Distrib., 614 F. Supp. at 
1125. This time the distributors appealed, arguing that the 
Act violated the Commerce Clause (a claim not made in 
AFD I), violated the First Amendment, and violated the 
Supremacy Clause because of preemption by the Copyright 
Act. We rejected the distributors' claims, and affirmed. AFD 
II, 800 F.2d at 369. 
 
With respect to the copyright preemption issue, we stated 
that in AFD I we had "conclusively established that the 
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Pennsylvania Act was not facially preempted by the 
Copyright Act," AFD II, 800 F.2d at 375, and construed our 
remand to have been for a factual determination by the 
District Court whether in actual operation the Act 
prevented or interfered with federally created rights. Id. at 
376. We noted that the distributors contended that "the 
limitation on the length of exclusive runs to 42 days 
interferes with the copyright owner's right to license 
exclusively for the life of the copyright," id., and we 
disagreed with the district court's construction of this 
provision to mean that the Act "permitt[ed] a distributor to 
enter into a series of exclusive contracts with the same 
exhibitor as long as no contract lasted longer than 42 
days," id. (citing 614 F. Supp. at 1123-24). In doing so, we 
reiterated that the language required the distributor " `to 
expand the run to second run or subsequent run theatres 
within the geographical area.' " Id. at 377 (quoting 73 P.S. 
S 203-7) (emphasis in opinion). Thus, although we rejected 
the district court's interpretation of the Act and emphasized 
the importance of the term "expand" in doing so, we offered 
no further opinion as to what the Act affirmatively required. 
 
We recognized "[t]here may be merit" to the preemption 
issue raised by the distributors but believed our prior 
opinion in AFD I decided the Pennsylvania Act is not 
facially invalid. Id. at 377. The writer of that opinion 
(coincidentally the writer of this opinion) opined that "the 
42-day clause is inconsistent with the Copyright Act," id. at 
377 n.3, but also believed we were bound by our prior 
opinion. 
 
As we have demonstrated above, we did not decide the 
issue whether the 42-day rule is preempted by the 
Copyright Act in AFD I. This writer concedes she erred in so 
stating in AFD II. As has been said and oft-repeated, 
"Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to 
reject it merely because it comes late." Henslee v. Union 
Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). In any event, it is apparent that our opinion in 
AFD II cannot be the basis for application of IOP 9.1 
because the issue was not actually decided there. And, as 
we explained earlier in this opinion, in Orson I we relied on 
the statement in AFD II that the issue had been decided in 
AFD I. 
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Accordingly, we believe that Orson is incorrect in arguing 
that the issue of the preemption of section 203-7 as now 
construed has previously been decided by this court. We 






The Supreme Court has recognized three ways in which 
federal law may preempt, and thereby displace, state law: 
(1) "express preemption," (2) "field preemption" (which is 
also sometimes referred to as "implied preemption"), or (3) 
"conflict preemption." See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy 
Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 
204 (1983); International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 
481, 491 (1987). Express preemption arises when there is 
an explicit statutory command that state law be displaced. 
See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 382 
(1992). An example of express preemption can be found in 
the subsection of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, stating that the provisions of that Act "shall 
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. 
S 1144(a). 
 
Under field- or implied-preemption principles, state law 
may be displaced "if federal law so thoroughly occupies a 
legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." 
Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Finally, state law may be displaced under conflict- 
preemption principles if the state law in question presents 
a conflict with federal law in one of two situations: when it 
is impossible to comply with both the state and the federal 
law, see Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 204, or when the state law 
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," 
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
 
As the Court has noted, these categories are not 
necessarily air-tight. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 
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U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990) ("By referring to these three 
categories, we should not be taken to mean that they are 
rigidly distinct. Indeed, field pre-emption may be 
understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law 
that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress' 
intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state 
regulation."). 
 
The Copyright Act contains an express preemption 
provision in S 301, which states, in relevant part: 
 
       On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable 
       rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
       within the general scope of copyright as specified by 
       section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a 
       tangible medium of expression and come within the 
       subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 
       and 103, whether created before or after that date and 
       whether published or unpublished, are governed 
       exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is 
       entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any 
       such work under the common law or statutes of any 
       State. 
 
17 U.S.C. S 301(a) (emphasis added). The exclusive rights in 
the copyrighted work granted by the Act are reproduction; 
preparation of derivative works; distribution by sale, rental, 
lease or lending; public performance, in the case of motion 
pictures or audiovisual works; and public display of 
individual images from motion pictures or audiovisual 
works. 17 U.S.C. S 106. 
 
State laws, whether statutory or common law, are subject 
to express preemption under Copyright Act S 301 only if 
they create rights that are "equivalent" to the exclusive 
rights within the general scope of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. 
S 301(a); see also Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (because literary works, including compilations 
and derivative works, are within the subject matter of 
copyright, state common law that purported to protect a 
work for which plaintiff 's copyright action was 
unsuccessful was preempted); 1 Melville B. Nimmer and 
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright S 1.01[B][1] (1998) 
(discussing various state law causes of action). 
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As noted above, conflict preemption may arise either 
because " `compliance with both regulations is a physical 
impossibility' or because the state law `stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.' " Jones, 430 U.S. at 
525; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
The purposes and objectives of Congress, which appear in 
the Copyright Act, are to implement a nationally uniform 
system for the creation and protection of rights in a 
copyrighted work. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 
561 (1973) (turning "to federal copyright law to determine 
what objectives Congress intended to fulfill"). 
 
An illustration of conflict preemption under the Copyright 
Act is provided by Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 
U.S. 691, 710-11 (1984). That case concerned an Oklahoma 
state law that banned advertising of alcoholic beverages by 
cable operators. However, the Copyright Revision Act of 
1976 established a program of compulsory copyright 
licensing under the regulations of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) pursuant to which a 
cable operator could transmit signals out of state upon 
payment of service royalties. The Supreme Court held the 
Oklahoma law preempted, not only because the FCC had 
explicitly preempted the area, but also because the state 
law would destroy or interfere with the exercise of a 
federally created copyright right. Id. at 710-11; see also 1 
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra, S 1.01[B][3]. Cf. Storer Cable 
Communications v. City of Montgomery, 806 F. Supp. 1518, 
1534 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (city ordinance requiring cable 
programming provider to license programs to additional 
entities unconstitutional through either S 301 or conflict 
preemption). 
 
In this case, Miramax argues both express preemption 
and conflict preemption. In the case before us, we might be 
able to apply both express preemption and conflict 
preemption but because our analysis more closely parallels 
that used in cases applying conflict principles, we proceed 
on that ground. 
 
In AFD I, in considering the distributors' claim of 
preemption we adopted the analytical structure previously 
employed by the Ohio federal courts construing the 
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comparable Ohio statute. AFD I, 683 F.2d at 817. Relying 
on S 301 of the Copyright Act, the Ohio district court posed 
the crucial question as "whether the. . . [motion picture] Act 
creates, grants, or destroys any rights that are `equivalent' 
to the exclusive rights of copyright set forth in 17 U.S.C. 
S 106." Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 443. 
That court concluded that the Ohio statute did not create 
rights equivalent to those in S 106, and did not deprive the 
distributors of copyright protections. Rather, the statute 
"provid[ed] procedures for the licensing of a film,. . . [and] 
recognize[d] sub silentio the right of the copyright owner to 
exhibit and to grant an exclusive or restrictive license to 
others to exhibit it." Id. 
 
In the same opinion, the Ohio court also rejected the 
argument that the Ohio statute stood as an obstacle to the 
federally protected copyright (i.e., conflict preemption), 
because it viewed the challenged provisions -- a limit on 
guarantees, a prohibition on negotiations following 
unsuccessful bidding, a process for bidding with a 
concomitant ban on blind bidding, and a requirement for a 
trade screening -- as regulating market practices, rather 
than the copyright itself. For example, the court observed, 
the exclusive rights conveyed by a copyright did not 
authorize a copyright owner to engage in anti-competitive 
practices in violation of antitrust laws or in fraudulent or 
deceptive practices. Id. at 447 (citing, inter alia, United 
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-57 
(1948), and Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 
1975)). Instead, the Ohio statute regulated distributors "in 
order to achieve fair and open bargaining," just as other 
state market regulations did. Id. 
 
The distribution of motion pictures has been the subject 
of attention since at least the 1940s when the Department 
of Justice filed antitrust suits attacking certain practices 
prevailing within the industry. See generally United States 
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (requiring 
distributors to divest ownership of exhibition theaters). 
Again, in 1968 the effort of the Department of Justice to 
correct certain distributors' business practices resulted in 
stipulations in effect from 1969 to 1975 which restricted 
the number of blind-bidding films placed on the market by 
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any single distributor. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 
F. Supp. at 417 & n.6; Patrick McNamara, "Copyright 
Preemption: Effecting the Analysis Prescribed by Section 
301," 24 Boston College L. Rev. 963, 990 (1983) (citing 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Civ. Action 87-273 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1968)).3 
 
The exhibitors and their trade association then lobbied 
state legislatures to adopt laws that prohibited blind 
bidding, and nearly half the states did so between 1978 
through 1983. See Kathy Herman, Comment, "Anti-Blind 
Bidding Legislation in the Motion Picture Industry: 
Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh," 5 J. L. & 
Com. 293, 299 (1984). 
 
The Pennsylvania Act is one of the most comprehensive 
of the regulatory statutes enacted in that period. See 
Associated Film Distrib., 520 F. Supp. at 979 (describing 
Pennsylvania's Act as "more comprehensive" than "Ohio's 
comparatively limited regulation"); see also Herman, supra, 
5 J. L. & Com. at 304. Its provisions prohibiting blind 
bidding, prohibiting advances, and limiting minimum 
guarantees are comparable to regulation by other states of 
several aspects of the licensing and distribution practices 
for exhibition of films, and Miramax does not challenge 
those regulatory provisions before us. 
 
The legislative findings and purposes included in the 
Pennsylvania Act set forth a litany of the unfair market 
practices it sought to prevent or ameliorate.4 One of the 
most egregious practices was that of blind bidding: the 
marketing and licensing of a film prior to its completion 
and without offering exhibitors a chance to trade screen the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In the mid-1980s, the Department of Justice also proceeded against 
improper market practices by theater exhibitors themselves. See 
generally Stanley I. Ornstein, "Motion Picture Distribution, Film 
Splitting, and Antitrust Policy," 17 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 415 
(1995). 
 
4. These legislative concerns included, inter alia, undue control of 
exhibitors; restraint, destruction, or inhibition of fair and honest 
competition; unfair and deceptive acts or practices; and withholding full 
information regarding prospective motion picture purchases or rentals in 
a blind-bidding process. See 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 203-3. 
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final product. As a result, distributors could make 
deceptive claims regarding films offered for bidding. See 
Associated Film Distrib., 614 F. Supp. at 1107 (discussing 
the distributors' practice of promoting films based on 
multiple screen stars who had only cameo roles or who 
were never seen together in a single scene); see also Allied 
Artists Pictures, 496 F. Supp. at 429-30 (describing 
information from distributors as "scant and sometimes 
misleading"). The Pennsylvania Act prohibits this practice. 
See 73 Pa. Cons. St. Ann. SS 203-4, -8(b); see also Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. S 1333.06(A). 
 
Closely tied to the problem of blind bidding was the 
unfairness in the bidding process itself which occurred 
when distributors would unseal closed bids in collusion 
with a favored exhibitor (the use of "five o'clock looks") in 
order to enable the exhibitor to offer a sufficiently high bid 
to obtain the film. See Associated Film Distrib., 614 F. 
Supp. at 1112 ("Collusion between favorites often controlled 
the bidding for pictures."); Allied Artists Pictures, 496 F. 
Supp. at 430. There was even talk that some distributors 
simply disregarded all the bids and awarded a license to a 
favored exhibitor. See id. 
 
To curtail these practices, the Pennsylvania Act requires 
that distributors issue invitations to bid that contain, in 
addition to the usual information, the names of all 
exhibitors invited to bid, and the day, time, and location for 
bid opening. See 73 Pa. Cons. St. Ann. S 203-8(a)-(c); see 
also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 1333.07(A)-(D). Both the 
Pennsylvania and the Ohio laws also require that exhibitors 
be able to examine all the bids. See 73 Pa. Cons. St. S 203- 
8(d); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 1333.07(E).5 
 
Another industry practice that Pennsylvania considered 
ripe for reform was the use of minimum guarantees and 
advances, see Associated Film Distrib., 614 F. Supp. at 
1109-10, which shifted the risks of unsuccessful 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Associated Film Distributors, the District Court observed that the 
Pennsylvania Act "permits oral bid solicitation and oral bids." 614 F. 
Supp. at 1112. Although the Act does not expressly permit an oral 
invitation to bid and bidding process, neither does it expressly prohibit 
either action. 
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exhibitions from distributors to exhibitors, who were 
required to pay fixed sums in advance of showing. See 
Allied Artists Pictures, 496 F. Supp. at 418. The provisions 
of the Pennsylvania Act directed to this practice prohibit 
minimum guarantee payments if there is also "a fee or 
other payment . . . based in whole or in part on the 
attendance or box office receipts," 73 Pa. Cons. St. S 203-5; 
see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. S 1333.06(B), and prohibit 
advance payments in contracts for exhibition. See 73 Pa. 
Cons. St. S 203-6. But see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
S 1333.06(C) (allowing advances but prohibiting 
requirement of payment more than fourteen days before 
theater's first exhibition). 
 
In AFD II, we recognized that statutes that bar exaction 
of advances from exhibitors, limit guarantees, and regulate 
the bidding and negotiation process may keep a distributor 
from achieving the optimal monetary return for the film. 
See AFD II, 800 F.2d at 376 (citing AFD I, 683 F.2d at 816 
(quoting Allied Artists Pictures, 679 F.2d at 662-63)). 
Nonetheless, we concluded that a reasonable government 
regulation that seeks to remedy problems caused by the 
economic disparity that impedes fairness in bargaining and 
honesty in business dealings is not impermissible merely 
because it has an economic effect on those regulated. 
 
These regulations do not create a preemption issue 
because they only "touch copyrighted works indirectly." 1 
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra, S 1.01[B][3][c] at 1-65. However, 
a state regulatory scheme that is "copyright-based in 
essence" presents a different matter. See id. The 42-day 
exclusive first-run license limitation in section 203-7 of the 
Pennsylvania Act is a distinctly different regulation from 
those within the state's power over improper market 
practices. If the state's ban on exclusivity after forty-two 
days directly regulates a right that is protected by federal 
copyright law, it must, of necessity, be preempted under 
conflict preemption principles. 
 
Among the "exclusive rights" granted underS 106 in the 
Copyright Act are the rights to "distribute" and to "perform 
the copyrighted work publicly." However, section 203-7 
requires the distributor to expand its distribution after 
forty-two days by licensing another exhibitor in the same 
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geographic area, even if such expansion is involuntary. A 
distributor who exercises its federal right to grant an 
exclusive license to an exhibitor of choice will be subject to 
liability under the Pennsylvania Act for refusing to grant 
licenses to other exhibitors in the same geographic area 
after the forty-second day. It is evident that the 
Pennsylvania Act regulates the essence of the federally 
protected copyright. 
 
That a copyright encompasses the right to refuse to 
license was reiterated by the Supreme Court in a decision 
post-dating AFD I and AFD II, which stated that the 
Copyright Act grants a copyright owner "the capacity 
arbitrarily to refuse to license one who seeks to exploit the 
work." Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990) 
(citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)); 
see also Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 114 (1981) 
(vesting "the liberty not to license rights in his work"); 
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 270 F.2d 146, 154 
(3d Cir. 1959) (recognizing corollary right under copyright 
law to exclude others under licensing right). 
 
In Storer Cable, 806 F. Supp. 1518, the court considered 
a challenge to a local ordinance that raised a presumption 
that cable programmers who entered into exclusive licenses 
for the broadcast of their programming were engaging in 
proscribed conduct. Although the city defended the 
ordinance as a legitimate antitrust and pro-competition 
regulation, the court held it was preempted because "a 
presumption that exclusive licensing contracts are illegal is 
. . . not amenable to any saving construction." Id. at 1540. 
The court noted that "[a] party who holds a copyright for 
cable programming and who does no more than grant 
another an exclusive distribution or exhibition license is 
then in automatic jeopardy of liability as a result of these 
sections, as is the licensee." Id. at 1539. 
 
Orson argues that once a copyright holder, such as 
Miramax, makes an initial distribution, a state is free to 
regulate the manner in which the work is thereafter 
distributed. We reject Orson's contention. In College 
Entrance Examination Board v. Pataki, 889 F. Supp. 554 
(N.D.N.Y. 1995), the court addressed a New York State law 
that required the owners of copyrights in certain 
 
                                21 
  
standardized tests, which were used, inter alia, for graduate 
school admissions, to file copies of those tests with the 
State after they were administered. The court held that the 
New York law improperly interfered with the copyright 
holders' rights under S 106 because it required 
reproduction and distribution of the copyrighted tests in 
the face of the owners' desire not to do so. 
 
Applying a similar analysis in this case, we note that 
Congress determined that the copyright holder should be 
granted exclusive rights under S 106, albeit for a limited 
period. Although a State regulation falling within the 
federally established exceptions to those rights, such as fair 
use, see 17 U.S.C. S 107, may obligate a copyright holder to 
change its practices to accommodate such uses, see, e.g., 
Association of Am. Med. Colleges v. Carey, 928 F.2d 519, 
525-26 (2d Cir. 1991) (remanding to district court to make 
factual findings on whether existing State law constitutes 
fair use), the parties here have not suggested, nor can we 
conclude, that the regulation enacted through section 203- 
7 falls within one of the Copyright Act's exceptions. 
 
Rather, the Pennsylvania Act, like the New York law 
regulating standardized tests, would impose on copyright 
holders, contrary to their exclusive rights underS 106, an 
obligation to distribute and make available other copies of 
the work following their initial decision to publish and 
distribute copies of the copyrighted item. Although it is 
true, as Orson points out, that the examiners in Association 
of American Medical Colleges and in College Entrance 
engaged in extensive efforts to prevent disclosure of their 
tests, see Appellee Br. at 17 n.10, this factor does not 
change the fundamental principle that these cases offer: 
the State may not mandate distribution and reproduction of 
a copyrighted work in the face of the exclusive rights to 
distribution granted under S 106. 
 
Even Orson's own quotation of Warner Bros., Inc v. 
Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah 1981), appeal 
dismissed and case remanded, 782 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 
1985), another federal decision discussing an anti-blind 
bidding statute, supports our distinction between 
regulations that are designed to assure a fair market and 
honest business dealings and those that direct a copyright 
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holder to distribute and license against its will or interests. 
That court stated, 
 
       The right to transfer or license copyrighted material for 
       use by others under sections 106 and 201 et seq. of 
       the Copyright Act has never encompassed a right to 
       transfer the work at all times and at all places free and 
       clear of all regulation; it has meant that the copyright 
       owner has the exclusive right to transfer the material 
       for a consideration to others. 
 
533 F. Supp. at 108 (emphasis added). Nothing in that 
quotation detracts from the copyright owner's exclusive 
federal right to decide to whom it will transfer the work. 
Moreover, the language from the same paragraph serves to 
support precisely the point made herein; as the Warner 
Bros. court stated, "No one has appropriated a product 
protected by the copyright law for commercial exploitation 
against the copyright owner's wishes." Id. at 108 (emphasis 
added). 
 
Unlike the provisions in the Pennsylvania Act that are 
directed to market practices that have no counterpart in 
the Copyright law, section 203-7 conflicts with the 
Copyright Act's grant to the copyright holder of an exclusive 
right to distribute and license a work, and it therefore 






In conclusion, we hold that because S 203-7 of the 
Pennsylvania Feature Motion Picture Fair Business 
Practices Law "stands as an obstacle" to the federally 
created exclusive rights given to a copyright holder, namely, 
the exclusive right to distribute the copyrighted work, it is 
preempted by the federal Copyright Act. Our dictum in AFD 
I that section 203-7 "may have a greater impact upon [a 




6. In light of our conclusion, we need not address Miramax's objections 
to the trial proceedings. 
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For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
decision of the District Court denying Miramax's Motion for 
Judgment as a Matter of Law and directing entry of 
judgment for Miramax. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The court makes a strong argument that Section 203-7 of 
the Pennsylvania Feature Motion Picture Fair Business 
Practices Law, 78 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 203-7 (the 
"Pennsylvania Act"), is invalid on its face under principles 
of conflict preemption, but I believe that this argument is 
foreclosed by the panel decision in Associated Film 
Distribution Corporation v. Thornburgh, 683 F.2d 808, 816- 
17 (3d Cir. 1982) ("AFD I"). In my view, Judge Sloviter, 
writing for the Court, interpreted AFD I correctly in 
Associated Film Distribution v. Thornburgh, 800 F.2d 369 
(3d Cir. 1986) ("AFD II"), when she wrote: 
 
       [T]he earlier decision of this court [" AFD I"] conclusively 
       established that the Pennsylvania Act was not facially 
       preempted by the Copyright Act. At the same time, we 
       recognized that in actual operation the Act might 
       prevent or interfere with the goals of the Copyright Act 
       and remanded for a factual determination by the 
       district court of the Act's actual impact on federally 
       created rights. 
 
Id. at 375-76. Specifically addressing the 42-day provision, 
Judge Sloviter wrote: 
 
       There may be merit to the distributors' argument that 
       the 42-day provision, when construed as limiting the 
       distributors' right to license an exclusive run to 42 
       days, is preempted by the Copyright Act. However, 
       such preemption would be apparent on the face of the 
       statute and cannot be reconciled with the court's 
       earlier decision that the Act is not facially invalid under 
       the Copyright Act. . . . [W]e are bound to that position. 
 
Id. at 377. 
 
In a footnote, she added: 
 
       The writer of this opinion believes that the 42-day 
       clause is inconsistent with the Copyright Act. The 
       Copyright Act gives the owner of a copyright the 
       exclusive right to distribute copies of the copyrighted 
       work by rental, lease, or lending. 17 U.S.C. S 106(3); 
       see also M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright S 8.11 at 8- 
       115 (1985). That right encompasses the grant of an 
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       exclusive license for a period as long as the copyright 
       owner desires within the term of the copyright. 
       Nonetheless, she feels compelled to join her colleagues 
       in affirming the district court decision because Internal 
       Operating Procedure 8C of this court [now IOP 9.1] 
       binds subsequent panels to reported panel opinions. 
       Court in banc consideration is required to overrule a 
       published opinion. 
 
Id. at 377 n.3. 
 
I also agree with the way AFD I was interpreted in the 
earlier appeal in this case. In Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film, 
Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.14 ( 3d Cir. 1996), the panel 
stated: 
 
       [W]e have already rejected a facial challenge to Section 
       203-7 under the Copyright Act, holding that "the Act 
       on its face contains no threat to copyrights themselves 
       . . . ." Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 
       683 F.2d 808, 816 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 480 
       U.S. 933, 107 S. Ct. 1573, 94 L.Ed. 2d 765 (1987); see 
       Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 800 
       F.2d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 
       933, 107 S. Ct. 1573, 94 L.Ed. 2d 765 (1987) . . . . 
 
While I entirely agree with the court that we are not 
constrained to follow dicta in prior opinions, I cannot 
reconcile the court's holding in this case with the holding of 
the prior panel in AFD I. The court's reinterpretation of AFD 
I is an innovative tour de force, but in the end I find it 
unconvincing. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                26 
